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WE NEED A FRESH START: REPEAL THE 
SEVENTH AMENDMENT 
Kevin C. Kennedyt 
Amendment VII 
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall 
exceed twenty dollars, the right to trial by jury shall be preserved, 
and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any 
Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the 
common law. 
Amendment XXVII 
Section 1. The seventh article of amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States is hereby repealed. 
Section 2. Except as otherwise provided by Congress, in civil 
actions brought in any court of the United States, all questions 
of fact shall be tried by a judge. 
Should we maintain the right to a jury trial in civil actions?! 
It is a question that we have been debating unabated for 
decades, and one that continues to fill the literature. 2 The 
battle lines are drawn, the debate ensues, but it always seems 
to end up in something of a draw. More often than not, where 
one stands seems to depend on where he sits. The plaintiffs' 
bar is enamored of the jury and its high verdicts. The defense 
bar does not trust the institution. When explaining the dif-
ferences between common law adversarial justice and civil law 
t Professor of Law, Detroit College of Law. B.A., University of Michigan, 
1973; J.D., Wayne State University, 1977; LL.M., Harvard University School of 
Law, 1982. 
1. My remarks and proposal are limited to civil actions brought in federal 
court. The Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury trial has never been held to 
be applicable to the states. At this late date, it is probably a moot point, given 
that the states have made that right a part of their own constitutions. Nevertheless, 
my proposal has equal bearing at the state level. 
2. See, e.g., PAULA DIPERNA, JURIES ON TRIAL (1984); VALERIE HANS & NEIL 
VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY (1986); MARK FINDLAY & PETER DUFF, THE JURY 
UNDER ATTACK (1988); REID HASTIE, STEVEN PENROD & NANCY PENNINGTON, INSIDE 
THE JURY (1983). 
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inquisitorial adjudication in criminal cases, one of my law 
school professors told us that if the accused actually committed 
the offense, then he stood a better chance of being acquitted 
in a common law court. If he were truly innocent of the 
charges, then his chances of acquittal were higher in a civil 
law court. I am not sure if this was meant as an indictment 
of the jury or of the adversary system as a whole, but it 
certainly had a sobering effect on me. 
Should jury trials in civil cases be abolished? I have a 
proposal that takes a middle-of-the-road approach and is there-
fore guaranteed to offend everyone: abolish the Seventh 
Amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases, but leave with 
Congress the power to authorize trial by jury in specific federal 
cases. If Congress does not grant the right in a class of civil 
lawsuit, then such actions would be tried to the judge. 
Why this task should be left to Congress I think can best 
be understood by considering the arguments that have been 
arrayed, pro and con, in the context of civil jury trials. 
I. THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST JURY TRIAL IN CIVIL CASES 
At least seven arguments have been made against civil jury 
trials. Judge Jerome Frank, one of the strongest critics of the 
jury system, launched the contemporary debate. 3 The most 
vocal modern critic of juries is Judge Edward Devitt. 4 I will 
summarize their arguments and add a few thoughts of my 
own. 
A. America Stands Alone in its Allegiance to Civil Jury 
Trials. 
Defenders of the jury system wax eloquent about how it is 
one of the great achievements of English and American 
jurisprudence. "An instrument of justice, a little parliament, 
the lamp that shows that freedom lives," in the words of Lord 
Devlin. But today the United States stands virtually alone in 
3. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 
109-23 (1949). 
4. Edward Devitt, Federal Civil Jury Trials Should Be Abolished, 60 A.B.A. 
J. 570 (1974). 
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the world with its retention of the right to trial by jury in 
civil cases. The right to trial by jury in England-the source 
of the right in the United States-has been all but abolished 
in civil cases. Canada and Scotland have abandoned it, as have 
most civil law jurisdictions. In the words of Judge Frank, "It 
will not do then to make Fourth-of-July speeches about the 
glorious jury system, to conceal its grave defects, or merely 
to palliate them with superficial, cosmetic-like, remedies." 
If one of the primary justifications for adoption of the 
Seventh Amendment was that the right to civil jury trial existed 
in England in 1791, then by a parity of reasoning the fact 
that England has all but abolished civil jury trials should be 
an adequate reason for abolishing that right in the United 
States. 
B. The Process of Jury Decision Making is a Black Box. 
Most jury verdicts are general verdicts. Although two 
procedural devices, the special verdict and general verdict with 
interrogatories, are ways of poking a tiny hole into that black 
box we call the jury room, those devices are rarely used. When 
a federal judge sits as the trier of fact, her decision making 
process is transparent because she must submit written findings 
of fact and conclusions of law. Reasoned decision making is 
the kind that we have come to expect in this country and the 
only kind that we will accept from governmental authorities. 
When a jury is empaneled and sworn, it certainly is as much 
an arm of government as the judge who presides over the 
trial. Yet when a jury returns a general verdict, it does not 
report what facts it has found, only in which parties' favor 
it has ruled. Its verdict is unexplained. We do not accept that 
from any other governmental authority, yet we accept it from 
a Jury. 
C. Jury Verdicts are the Product of Compromise, Not 
Group Deliberation and Rational Decision Making. 
Why do we throw a cloak of secrecy over the deliberative 
processes of the jury? We say that it is for the jurors' protection: 
to insulate them from pressures. This is the explanation given 
for the evidentiary rule prohibiting impeachment of the verdict 
on the basis of a juror's testimony as to any matter that 
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occurred during the course of deliberations, excepting improper 
outside influences. S In fact, the blanket of darkness does protect 
the integrity of the verdict because few jury verdicts could 
stand the blinding light of truth. Judge Frank states that juries 
again and again arrive at their verdicts either by the quotient 
method (the amount each juror wants to award is added up 
and the sum divided by the number of jurors) or the flip of 
a coin. In fact, the cloak of secrecy is for our protection. We 
prefer to be kept in the dark about how juries actually behave, 
because the truth would not only be too painful, the truth 
would force us to abandon trial by jury as it is currently used. 
Judge Learned Hand realized this problem in Jorgensen v. 
York Ice Machinery Corp.6 In the course of explaining the 
rationale for the evidentiary rule prohibiting jurors from 
impeaching their own verdict, Judge Hand stated: 
[IJt would be impracticable to impose the counsel of absolute 
perfection that no verdict shall stand, unless every juror has been 
entirely without bias, and has based his vote only upon evidence 
he has heard in court. It is doubtful whether more than one in a 
hundred verdicts would stand such a test; and although absolute 
justice may require as much, the impossibility of achieving it has 
induced judges to take a middle course, for they have recognized 
that the institution could not otherwise survive; they would become 
Penelopes, forever engaged in unravelling the webs they wove. Like 
much else in human affairs, its defects are so deeply enmeshed in 
the system that wholly to disentangle them would quite kill it. 7 
Judge Hand's candor is refreshing. He had the solution to 
his dilemma at his fingertips, but he pulled back his hand, or 
was repelled at the thought. The honest, but perhaps painful, 
solution to the impermissible compromise and bias that is the 
jury verdict is to abandon jury trial. 
D. Jurors Do Not Understand the Instructions or the 
Evidence. 
When a judge sets aside a jury verdict and either grants a 
new trial or enters judgment notwithstanding the verdict, it is 
5. FED. R. EVID. 606(b). 
6. 160 F.2d 432 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 764 (1947). 
7. [d. at 435 (emphasis added). 
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a drastic step. If the judge was correct in setting aside the 
jury's verdict-and many reported appellate decisions attest to 
the correctness of the trial judge's action in this regard-then 
the judge's action means that somewhere along the line 
something serious went wrong with the jury pr0gess. Several 
possibilities exist. Excluding bribery or tampering with the jury, 
it could mean that the jury drew an impermissible inference 
from the evidence adduced at trial, either because it ignored 
certain evidence or misunderstood the evidence. It could also 
mean that the jury ignored or misunderstood the instructions 
given by the presiding judge on the applicable law. 
In Michigan, the clerk administers the following oath to 
jurors: 
Each of you do solemnly swear (or affirm) that, in this action 
now before the court, you will justly decide the questions submitted 
to you, that, unless you are discharged by the court from further 
deliberation, you will render a true verdict, and that you will render 
your verdict only on the evidence introduced and in accordance 
with the instructions of the court, so help you God. S 
Let us give jurors the benefit of the doubt and assume that 
they attempt in good faith to follow their oath. If you look 
at pattern jury instructions, the drafting and publishing of 
which has become something of a cottage industry for lawyers, 
it is easy to see how a juror might misunderstand the law. 
Before an instruction receives the imprimatur of a "pattern" 
instruction, it is crafted by judges and lawyers over the course 
of several years, using as guideposts appellate decisions 
approving and disapproving of different verbal formulations. 
The instructions are reworked, honed, and refined, until they 
finally become pattern instructions. Then they are left to ossify. 
"Why tinker with language that has been approved by an 
appellate court," lawyers and judges ask themselves, "and run 
the risk of reversal?" 
Reading some of them makes one wonder if any thought 
was given by the lawyers who drafted them and the courts 
which approved them to whether a layperson could ever have 
any hope of understanding them. They are complex and prolix. 
8. MICH. CT. R. 2.511(G). 
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Take, for example, Michigan's Standard Jury Instructions in 
an automobile collision case.9 The. standard instructions go on 
for over a dozen pages, delivered orally in open court, without 
the benefit of notes to refresh the jurors' recollections. Even 
a simple legal concept such as preponderance of the evidence 
can tie a court up in verbal knots when it tries to give an 
instruction defining it. Consider the following pattern jury 
instruction from New York: 
The burden of proof rests on the plaintiff. That means it must 
be established by a fair preponderance of the credible evidence 
that the claim the plaintiff makes is true. The credible evidence 
means the testimony or exhibits that you find to be worthy to be 
believed. A preponderance means the greater part of such evidence. 
That does not mean the greater number of witnesses or the greater 
length of time taken by either side. The phrase refers to the quality 
of the evidence, that is, its convincing quality, the weight and 
effect it has on your minds. The law requires that, in order for 
the plaintiff to prevail, the evidence that supports his claim must 
appeal to you as more nearly representing what took place than 
that opposed to his claim. If it does not, or if it weighs so evenly 
that you are unable to say that there is a preponderance on either 
side, then you must resolve the question in favor of the defendant. 
It is only if the evidence favoring the plaintiff's claim outweighs 
the evidence opposed to it that you can find in favor of plaintiff. 10 
One commentator has said of a similar instruction, 
"Gobbledygook." II If jurors cannot understand these words 
and phrases, that is, if they cannot understand the governing 
legal rules, then the parties' reliance on those rules, although 
justified, is nonetheless misplaced. 12 
Assuming that jurors do understand the legal rules they are 
instructed to apply to the facts as determined by them, can 
the jurors understand the evidence introduced at trial? The 
odds against seem high. First of all, the evidence is not presented 
all at once; it is not presented in any logical or orderly fashion; 
9. ROBERT DEAN, MICHIGAN COURT RULES PRACTICE § 102.09 (1985). 
10. NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS 1:23 (2d ed. 1974). 
11. DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW 433-34 (1963). 
12. A 1979 empirical linguistic study showed that jurors did not understand 
standard jury instructions. Robert Charrow & Veda Charrow, Making Legal Lan-
guage Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study oj Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1306 (1979). 
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and it is presented in an atmosphere that will often be 
emotionally charged. Is it reasonable to expect jurors to suspend 
judgment until the end of the case? Secondly, the latter half 
of the twentieth century has witnessed the phenomenon of 
complex litigation, where the legal issues (such as antitrust or 
securities fraud) are complicated and the trials seemingly 
interminable. Are jurors adequately equipped as fact-finders 
in complex cases?13 The tantalizingly cryptic footnote ten in 
the Supreme Court's Ross v. Bernhard14 decision suggests that 
they may not be, and when they are not, there is no Seventh 
Amendment right to a jury trial. 
E. The Various Judicial Controls Over Jury Action Show 
That We Really Do Not Trust Juries. 
When you consider the variety of judicial controls that 
circumscribe jury action, you have to ask yourself whether we 
truly trust juries with the law and the evidence. Juries are 
controlled by the procedural devices of directed verdict, judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, and new trial. With the last device, 
the judge actually is permitted to second-guess the jury, to 
act as a thirteenth (or seventh) juror, and weigh the evidence 
and make credibility resolutions. This distrust of juries is further 
reflected in the rules of evidence, in particular the hearsay 
rule, which keep from jurors witnesses' second-hand accounts 
of what someone else said. Even though most daily activities 
are conducted in reliance on hearsay, jurors are not considered 
competent to make allowance for the second-hand nature of 
such testimony and, as a consequence, are prevented from 
hearing it at all. 
F. In Honoring the Seventh Amendment's Command to 
"Preserve" the Right to Jury Trial, the Supreme Court 
Has Created an Analytical Swamp. 
The Supreme Court's Seventh Amendment jurisprudence 
leaves a lot to be desired. To describe the Court's civil jury 
13. See Daniel Margolis & Evan Slavitt, The Case Against Trial by Jury in 
Complex Civil Litigation, 7 LITIG., Fall 1980, at 19. 
14. 396 U.S. 531 (1970). The Court stated that "[t]he Seventh Amendment 
question depends on the nature of the issue to be tried rather than the character 
of the overall action." Id. at 538. In footnote 10, the Court added: "As our cases 
indicate, the 'legal' nature of an issue is determined by considering, first, the pre-
merger custom with reference to such questions; second, the remedy sought; and, 
third, the practical abilities and limitations of juries .... " Id. at 538 n.l0. 
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trial cases as result-oriented and intellectually indefensible would 
not be an exaggeration. In Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood,15 the 
Court had no hesitation in recharacterizing the relief sought 
(an accounting which had historically been equitable in nature) 
as actually being a claim for damages, a legal remedy. A 
similar result was achieved in Ross v. Bernhard,16 where a 
shareholder's derivative action-a procedural device that was 
a creation of equity-was labeled as being legal because the 
underlying claim sought damages on behalf of the corporation. 
Cosmetic surgery on the face of history is hardly a substitute 
for rigorous legal analysis. 
In some instances the problem has not been of the Court's 
making, however. Take, for example, the situation where 
Congress enacts legislation creating a private civil action but 
is invariably silent on the question of jury trial. The question 
is ultimately dumped in the lap of the Court to answer. From 
Curtis v. Loether,17 to Tull v. United States,IS to Chauffeurs, 
Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry,19 the Court has 
wrestled with the question of what is the proper analytical 
approach to take in resolving this problem. Should the Court 
look to historical analogues, as it does? That exercise invariably 
proves futile. It ends up in a draw, with the party who is 
resisting a jury trial arguing persuasively that the specific cause 
of action is analogous to certain historical equitable actions, 
and the party who is arguing for a jury trial contending just 
as persuasively that the correct analogy is to actions historically 
legal in nature. The Court then ends up examining the nature 
of the remedy sought, and as was the case in Dairy Queen 
and Ross, characterizing the remedy as either equitable or 
legal, and reaching a decision. None of these decisions is ever 
unanimous, with Justices disagreeing over history and the proper 
analogies. In the end, trying to "preserve" in 1991 a right as 
it existed in 1791 is quixotic. It would probably be more 
15. 369 u.s. 469 (1962). 
16. 396 u.s. 531 (1970). 
17. 415 u.s. 189 (1974) (right to jury trial in title VIII housing discrimination 
cases). 
18. 481 U.S. 412 (1987) (right to jury trial on issue of liability in Clean Water 
Act cases, but judge decides remedy). 
19. 494 U.S. 558 (1990) (right to jury trial in breach of duty of fair repre-
sentation claim). 
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meaningful to ask Alexander Hamilton what he thinks about 
the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve Board. Hamilton, 
incidentally, acknowledged in The Federalist No. 81 "that I 
cannot readily discern the inseparable connection between the 
existence of liberty and the trial by jury in civil cases. "20 
G. Jury Trial Creates Delays, Adding to the Costs of a 
Process That Is Already Beyond the Means of Most. 
By one estimate,21 jury trials take sixty-seven percent longer 
than bench trials. The process of empaneling jurors (voir dire); 
arguments over evidentiary matters; arguments over jury 
instructions; arguments over whether there is a right to jury 
trial in the first place; jury deliberation; aborted trials due to 
hung juries or to counsel misconduct; and aborted trials because 
the jury misunderstood or misapplied the instructions, the 
evidence, or both, all add to the delay already endemic to the 
trial process, which necessarily translates into increased costs 
for the litigants and means that those who have never had 
their day in court must wait still another day. 
The Supreme Court approved the use of six-person juries 
in federal civil cases in its 1973 decision, Colgrove v. Battin.22 
Although the Court did not state it was doing so out of 
concern for trimming the costs connected with jury trials, the 
decision implicitly acknowledged the institutional costs of twelve-
person juries. If the requirement of a twelve-person civil jury 
has fallen in the name of efficiency, can the requirement of 
jury unanimity be far behind? On the other hand, just last 
term the Court added to the costs associated with civil jury 
trials by extending Batson v. Kentucky,23 and prohibiting the 
use of peremptory challenges by a private litigant to 
systematically remove venirepersons from the jury panel on 
the basis of race.24 The Court's courage in eliminating this 
intolerable practice from civil trials must be applauded, but it 
20. THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton). 
21. HANS ZEISEL, HARRY KALVEN, JR. & B. BUCHHOLZ, DELAY IN THE COURT 
71-81 (1959). 
22. 413 U.S. 149 (1973). 
23. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
24. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., IllS. Ct. 2077 (1991). 
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will be muted applause because the trial process will be further 
protracted, as Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent in 
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete CO.2S It will not be surprising 
if Edmonson becomes the genesis of challenges at both the 
trial and appellate level to an alleged use of racially motivated 
peremptories. While meritorious challenges should not be 
discouraged, it must be recognized that all such challenges, 
meritorious and frivolous, will add to litigation delays. 
II. THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF JURY TRIAL IN CIVIL 
CASES 
At least four arguments have been made in support of the 
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. The arguments are 
historical, populist, or based on empirical research that has 
attempted to measure jury performance. 
A. Public Participation in the Judicial Process Performs a 
Legitimating and Socializing Function. 
The law exists to serve the people, not the reverse. To that 
end, the jury is an important vehicle for conferring legitimacy 
to the law. 26 In a democracy, the average citizen· obeys the 
law not out of fear of punishment but because the average 
citizen views the law as legitimate. For the law to be responsive 
to the needs, wants, and desires of the people-in other words, 
to maintain legitimacy-it is essential that there be public 
participation in the judicial process, and such participation 
must include jury service. Public participation is essential to 
public acceptance of courts as forums for dispute resolution. 
If the judicial process loses popular acceptance, then the law 
may be ignored and extralegal methods of dispute settlement, 
such as self-help, may be resorted to. In addition, not only 
does the jury allow the average citizen the opportunity to 
contribute to the legal system, service on the jury educates the 
average citizen about the legal system.27 Jurors' lives are enriched 
by the experience. 
25. Id. at 2096 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
26. VALERIE HANS & NEll. VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 248 (1986). 
27. Id. at 249. 
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Nearly twenty-five years ago, Judge Irving Kaufman observed 
that there can be no universal respect for the law unless the 
people feel that it is their law. 28 To that end, the jury plays 
an indispensable role in making Americans feel that they have 
a stake in molding the process and making it work. As another 
commentator has noted, "When large classes of people are 
denied a role in the legal process-even if that denial is wholly 
unintentional or inadvertent-there is a sense of alienation from 
the legal order.' '29 
B. The Jury Is a Shield Against Possible Corruption. 
As noted, Alexander Hamilton did write in Federalist No. 
8} that he could not see any strong link between liberty and 
civil jury trials. 30 He also argued against a constitutional right 
to a jury trial in civil cases in Federalist No. 83, but nevertheless 
conceded that juries can serve as a bulwark against corrupt 
judges: 
The strongest argument in its favor (Le., requiring juries) is, that 
it is a security against corruption. As there is always more time 
and better opportunity to tamper with a standing body of magistrates 
than with a jury summoned for the occasion, there is room to 
suppose that a corrupt influence would more easily find its way 
to the former than the latter. . . . [T]he trial by jury must still be 
a valuable check upon corruption. It greatly multiplies the 
impediments to its success. As matters now stand, it would be 
necessary to corrupt both court and jury; for where the jury [sic] 
have gone evidently wrong, the court will generally grant a new 
trial, and it would be in most cases of little use to practice upon 
the jury, unless the court could be likewise gained. Here then is 
a double security; and it will readily be perceived that this complicated 
agency tends to preserve the purity of both institutions. By increasing 
the obstacles to success, it discourages attempts to seduce the 
integrity of either. 31 
One factor that motivated the adoption of the Seventh 
Amendment was bitter memories of justice being meted out 
28. Irving R. Kaufman, A Fair Jury-The Essence of Justice, 51 JUDICATURE 
88, 91 (1967). 
29. Lex Hawkins, The Case for Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Litigation, 7 
LITlG., Fall 1980, at 15 [hereinafter Lex Hawkins]. 
30. THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton). 
31. THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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at the hands of the King's judges. Juror protection would have 
insulated litigants from judicial abuse. Although the King's 
judges are long gone, there is no reason to believe that the 
risk of judicial corruption is still not a valid concern. Corruption 
of a judge need not be as blatant as bribery in order for it 
to exist. It can come in subtle forms that even the judge may 
not be cognizant of, such as favoritism to one side or the 
other because of past associations the judge has developed 
with counsel. 32 In their seminal study of the American jury, 33 
Harry Kalven, Jr. and Hans Zeisel found that former prosecutors 
who became judges were more prone to convict than those 
who had not held such office. 34 The group nature of the jury 
decision minimizes corruption of the finder of fact. 
Judge Charles Joiner of the Eastern District of Michigan 
summed it up well when he stated that "decisions by juries 
properly instructed and taught are better than decisions by 
single judges. . . . The principal reason for this is that the 
process of deliberation is a process through which the biases 
of individual jurors are exposed and isolated or 
controlled . . . ." 3S 
c. The Bench and Bar, Not the Jury, Cause the Problems 
Associated with Jury Trial. 
The source of the problems associated with jury trial is at 
bottom created by the bench and bar, not the jury itself. If 
trial judges would use Rule 1636 more aggressively to simplify 
issues, obtain admissions and stipulations, unnecessary proofs 
could be avoided. The rules of evidence should be used to 
exclude the introduction of needlessly cumulative evidence. 37 
Jurors should be permitted to take notes to aid their recollection, 
just as counsel and judges do. The jury should be given 
32. Barry E. Ungar & Theodore R. Mann, The Jury and the Complex Civil 
Case, 6 Lmo., Spring 1980, at 1. 
33. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966). 
34. Id. at 471. 
35. RITA J. SIMON, THE JURY: ITs ROLE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 23 (1980) (quoting 
Charles Joiner, Perspectives on the Function and Value of the Jury in America 
from the Bench, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA 155-56 (Rita J. Simon, ed. 
1975». 
36. FED. R. CIY. P. 16. 
37. See FED. R. EVID. 403. 
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preliminary instructions on the law and on the issues so that 
they do not have to hear evidence in a complete vacuum.38 In 
Judge Joiner's view, "Judges, lawyers, and court staff have 
a heavy burden to make the system work. All of them must 
make jurors feel at home in the strange environment of the 
courthouse by making certain the jurors understand everything 
they are asked to do. "39 
D. Jury Verdicts Are the Product of Rational 
Deliberations. 
In the landmark study conducted by Harry Kalven, Jr. and 
Hans Zeisel in the mid-1960's,40 four thousand jury verdicts 
in civil cases were compared with the judgments that 550 trial 
judges said they would have reached in the same cases. The 
correlation between the judges' judgments and the juries' verdicts 
was high, with the level of agreement being seventy-nine percent. 
Kalven and Zeisel concluded that the most probable explanation 
for the twenty-one percent disagreement was the closeness of 
the cases. Considering that over ninety percent of all civil cases 
settle or are otherwise disposed of prior to trial, one would 
expect only close cases to be actually tried. In close cases, 
reasonable minds can certainly differ as to what the facts are 
in the particular case. Being reasonable persons, it should 
therefore come as no surprise that judges and jurors would 
have disagreement in close cases. What does come as somewhat 
of a surprise is that there should be such a high level of 
agreement between the two groups. Moreover, if the rate of 
disagreement was zero, then juries would be nothing more than 
window dressing. Kalven and Zeisel's unequivocal conclusion 
drawn from this data is that the jury understands its job and 
performs it competently. 
A 1983 study41 analyzed jurors' ability to recall the facts 
and the law. Reid Hastie, Steven Penrod, and Nancy Pennington 
38. See Lex Hawkins, supra note 29, at 18. 
39. Charles Joiner, Perspectives on the Function and Value of the Jury in 
America from the Bench, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA 23 (Rita J. Simon, 
ed. 1975). 
40. HARRY KALvEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966). 
41. REm HASTIE, STEVEN D. PENROD & NANCY PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY 
(1983). 
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found that although individually jurors' memories were 
moderately good at recalling the facts and the law, collectively 
juries remembered ninety percent of the evidence and eighty 
percent of the instructions.42 The conclusion they reached is 
that the major obstacle to proper jury decision is the trial 
judge's instructions. They make the modest proposal that a 
written transcript or videotape of the instructions accompany 
the jury into the jury room. 
III. REPEAL THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT; LET CONGRESS 
SETTLE THE DEBATE. 
Let's face it: if Congress wanted to, it could effectively 
repeal the Seventh Amendment by flexing the muscle given it 
in Articles I and III. Congress has the exclusive power under 
Article III to create (and abolish) lower federal courts and to 
limit their jurisdiction when it does create them. Congress has 
also reserved to itself its Article III power to approve or reject 
proposed rules of procedure and evidence applicable in the 
federal courts. 43 Congress, if it so desired, could throw the 
baby out with the bath water, that is, it could effectively repeal 
the Seventh Amendment in a number of ways, or at least 
whittle the Amendment down considerably. For example, Con-
gress could abolish all lower federal courts, mooting the ques-
tion of whether there is a constitutional right to trial by jury 
in civil cases. Congress could repeal all jurisdictional grants 
to lower federal courts in civil cases, and again moot the 
Seventh Amendment question. Or Congress could entrust the 
adjudication of federal statutory rights and remedies to an 
administrative agency, once again bypassing the jury. 44 
That Congress has not taken any of these steps is, I think, 
an indication that Congress as a body has no institutional bias 
in favor of or against jury trials. It is some indication, con-
cededly not overwhelming, that Congress can be trusted with 
the task of deciding in a dispassionate and balanced way 
whether and when a right to jury trial should exist in given 
42. Id. at 81. 
43. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2074 (West Supp. 1991). 
44. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHA, 430 U.S. 442 (1977). 
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cases. A reason why Congress should be trusted with this task 
can be found in Article III. A quick review of that Article 
reminds us that the framers entrusted the critical questions of 
the creation of lower federal courts, the jurisdiction of those 
courts, and their rules of procedure with the legislative branch. 
I do not think that trust was misplaced. In addition, Congress 
is aware of and has shown a sensitivity to the issues of expense 
and delay in civil litigation, as evidenced by the Civil Justice 
Reform Act of 1990.45 That Act mandates that every judicial 
district develop a civil justice expense and delay reduction plan 
that will address techniques of litigation management and meth-
ods of reducing cost and delay. 46 
The arguments for and against civil jury trial raise as many 
questions as they answer. What significance, if any, should 
we place on the decline of the jury trial in other democracies? 
Are not the proofs the abolitionists rely on to show the existence 
of sympathy and prejudice in jury verdicts anecdotal rather 
than the product of systematic empirical research? On the other 
hand, do the systematic empirical approaches of the advocates 
prove that jury verdicts are free of prejudice and sympathy? 
Is there any proof that judges are better able than juries at 
recalling evidence? Is there any proof that sympathy and prej-
udice are absent from a judge's judgment? What empirical 
demonstration is there that juries, rather than the judges and 
the bar, are responsible for court delay? These are all important 
questions. To the extent definitive answers exist for them, those 
answers could go a long way toward stilling the debate. None 
of them, however, can be answered by a court. Finding answers 
to these questions requires the active participation of and 
direction from the legislative branch. 
The American litigation explosion never could have been 
anticipated by the founding fathers. I am sure that to a man 
they would blanch upon learning of the volume of pending 
cases on the federal civil docket. We need a fresh start. My 
proposal is to wipe the slate clean by repealing the Seventh 
Amendment and leaving it with Congress to decide whether 
45. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 471-482). 
46. See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 471-473 (West Supp. 1991). 
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litigants have a right to a jury trial in a given class of cases. 
Congress can commission studies, hold public hearings, and 
ultimately make findings that take into account and balance 
all of the political benefits and economic costs of trial by jury. 
Armed with the facts-facts that no court can assemble-
Congress would be in the best position to make a judgment 
as to whether a right to jury trial should be accorded in any 
particular class of civil case. The Supreme Court would be 
relieved of the tortuous task of trying to determine whether 
a litigant has a constitutional right to a jury trial when Congress 
creates a new statutory right enforceable in federal court. If 
Congress has not spoken, then there would be no such right. 
